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1. INTRODUCTION
Many scholars and practitioners of environmental law believe that
today's environmental problems are getting worse as the result of an
"environmental logjam" in the United States.' The "logjam" refers to the fact
that the United States' regulatory infrastructure is outdated, problematic, and
inadequate to address new challenges such as climate change. 2 A number of
environmental law scholars and practitioners converged upon New York in
late March 2008 in order to discuss possible approaches to breaking this
"logjam," the results of which will be compiled in a report for the next
Congress and President.3 The political scene provided an optimistic backdrop
for this conference. For example, each of the three top presidential candidates
at the time claimed that taking care of the environment, particularly with
respect to climate change and the promotion of clean and renewable energy,
was among his or her top priorities.4 In its first year under Democratic
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I See, e.g., New York University School of Law, Symposium, Background of the
Breaking the Logjam Project, http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/conferences/btl/background.html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Breaking the Logjam].
2 Id. The United States' environmental regulatory structure was mostly developed in
the 1970s and 1980s. Id. Among the failings shared by most environmental statutes are
compartmentalization, hidden trade-offs, misappropriation of enforcement authority, and
the dominance of command-and-control regulations. Id.
3 Id.
4 As of March 2008, three presidential candidates remained: Hillary Clinton, Barack
Obama, who would eventually win the election, and John McCain. Hillary Clinton enjoys
an eighty-seven percent lifetime voting score from the League of Conservation Voters
and places clean energy and global warming among the top issues in her campaign. See
Clinton Campaign, Powering America's Future: New Energy, New Jobs,
http://web.archive.org/web/20080208014657/http://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008); Grist, Clinton on the Issues, http://www.grist.org/
feature/2007/08/09/clintonfactsheet/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). In a speech given in
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leadership since 1994, Congress passed legislation that caused the League of
Conservation Voters to claim that "2007 may well be remembered as a
turning point for the environment." 5 Moreover, congressional Democrats
expanded their majority in the 2008 election cycle. 6 The corporate setting,
like its political equivalent, has witnessed an increased response to
environmental concerns, particularly in the areas of climate change and
sustainable energy. 7 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, recent public
Des Moines, Iowa, on Oct. 14, 2007, Barack Obama said, "I don't believe that climate
change is just an issue that's convenient to bring up during a campaign. I believe it's one
of the greatest moral challenges of our generation." See Obama Campaign, Energy &
Environment, http://web.archive.org/web/20080222011959/http://www.barackobama.
com/issues/energy/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). Sen. Obama enjoys an eighty-six percent
lifetime voting score from the League of Conservation Voters and earned significant
environmental cachet in response to an October 2007 speech in New Hampshire that
unveiled an aggressive climate and energy plan. Grist, Obama on the Issues,
http://www.grist.org/feature/2007/07/30/obamafactsheetl (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
John McCain paints himself as a common sense steward of the land, focused on
conserving natural resources and addressing global wanning. McCain Campaign,
Steward of Our Nation's Rich Natural Heritage, at http://www
.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/65bdOfbe-737b-485 1-a7e7d9a37cb278db.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008). Sen. McCain, considered one of the "greenest" Republicans, has
been a leader in Congress on the issue of global warming and named it one of three key
issues for his presidency. Grist, McCain on the Issues, http://www.grist.org/
feature/2007/10/01/mccainfactsheet/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008); Scott Condon,
McCain: No Compromise, ASPEN TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at Al.
5 LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ScOREcARD 2
(2007), available at http://lcv.org/scorecard/2007.pdf. Even within the Democratic Party,
there are signs that environmental concerns may get more attention going forward. For
example, Democratic Rep. John Dingell, Chairman of the Energy and Commerce
Committee and long-time opponent of the environmental movement, is having trouble
exerting his power on Capital Hill. Glenn Hurowitz, Dingell Versus the Democrats, AM.
PROSPECT, Aug. 7, 2007, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?
article=dingell vs the democrats ("[T]he reason for Dingell's decreasing power is that
he's become rather unpopular within a Democratic caucus that's . . . increasingly
unwilling to accept his ... open war with the environmental movement.").
6 Michael M. Grynbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Pick Up at Least 5
Senate Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008.
7 Ceres, 2007 Proxy Season Produces Strong Results on Climate Change,
http://www.ceres.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=428&srcid=554 (last visited
Nov. 18 2008) ("Investors engaging with US companies on the financial risks and
opportunities from climate change had their most successful year to date during the 2007
proxy season."); Ceres, Annual Report 2006 & Beyond, at 4-7,
http://www.ceres.org/NETCOMMfUNITY/page.redir?target-http%3a%22/o2f216.235.20
1.250%2fNETCOMMUNITY%2ff)ocument.Doc%3fid%3d 137&srcid=592&erid=0 (last
visited Nov 18, 2008) (highlighting successful efforts to educate and mobilize investors
on issues such as climate change and sustainability, and describing programs connecting
stakeholders with corporate directors).
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opinion polls have shown that the majority of Americans believe that there is
"too little" government regulation and involvement in the area of
environmental protection. 8 Thus, largely due to energy and climate change
concerns, the United States appears poised to begin a new era in
environmental regulation.
One of the most common ways for a government to address
environmental concerns is to regulate the private use of land and other
natural resources. 9 Because land use restrictions usually have a negative
impact on the economic value of privately owned property, breaking the
environmental "logjam" in the United States will almost certainly result in a
flood of social and legal conflict. This Note will focus upon the legal conflict
that manifests itself in claims made under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that some
regulations so severely undermine the economic value of private property
that the government, despite not physically "taking" the property, has
nonetheless done the functional equivalent thereof, and therefore must pay
just compensation for the resulting loss in land value. 10 The Court, however,
has not defined with any precision the degree of loss that triggers protection
under the Fifth Amendment.11 The resulting uncertainty provides fertile
8 The Harris Poll, Oct. 16-23, 2007, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/
enviro.htm. The chart below reflects the opinions of the American populace regarding the
amount of environmental protection that state and federal regulatory schemes currently
provide. The fact that a very high percentage of Democrats believe there is "too little"
environmental regulation highlights the significance of a Democratic congressional
majority. However, it must be noted that, even among Republicans, more individuals
believe there is "too little" environmental regulation rather than "too much." Id.
70.
60.




All Adults Republicans Democrats Independents
9 Craig T. Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United
States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 510 (2007) (discussing the many ways in which
land use regulations have and may be used in ecosystem protection).
10 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
11 Id. at 539-40; William W. Wade, "Sophistical and Abstruse Formulas" Made
Simple: Advances in Measurement of Penn Central's Economic Prongs and Estimation of
Economic Damages in Federal Claims and Federal Circuit Courts, 38 URB. LAW. 337,
349 (2007).
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ground for the ever-growing and, arguably, irreconcilable conflict between
proponents of land use regulation and supporters of private property rights. 12
This conflict is exacerbated in the context of environmental regulation
because, historically, the United States has placed little economic value upon
the ecological qualities of land. 13 As a result, regulations designed to
preserve ecological qualities generally impose significant damage upon the
economic value of the regulated land, thereby providing the owners of such
land with a strong claim to just compensation under the regulatory takings
doctrine. Most governmental entities in the United States have limited
budgets and are therefore unable to pass legislation that would require just
compensation payments. 14 Thus, the regulatory takings doctrine, combined
with the low economic values traditionally associated with the ecological
12 Harvey M. Jacobs, New Actions or New Arguments Over Regulatory Takings?,
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 66, 69-70 (2007) (concluding that the two sides-
proponents of regulation on one and the private property rights movement on the other-
are not amenable to the idea of compromise). The battles that arise from this conflict take
place in both the courts and the legislatures. See Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for
Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1520
(2007) (examining several 2006 state ballot initiatives that proposed mandatory
compensation payments for any regulation that diminishes private land values to any
degree).
13 In the posthumous publication of A Sand County Almanac in 1949--considered a
landmark book in the environmental movement-Aldo Leopold criticized American
conservation efforts based upon economic motives because ecological qualities of land
had no economic value and thus went unaccounted in such a system. See ALDO LEOPOLD,
A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 237-64 (Carolyn Clugston Leopold & Luna B. Leopold eds.,
Ballantine Books 1970) (1949). As a result, Leopold believed that ecological
conservation, to be successful, must be based upon the development of a "land ethic"
whereby society departs from the idea that land is property and instead accepts the idea
that the soil, water, plants, and animals making up the land are, along with humans,
members of the same community. See id. In other words, Leopold believed that
conservation could only be achieved if humans developed and acted upon a sense of right
and wrong with respect to their relationship with the ecological qualities of land. See id.
The concept of this Note was developed in large part upon the hypothesis that the
emerging market in conservation easements represent Leopold's land ethic as manifested
in the monetary decisions of a small number of rational individuals.
14 See, e.g., John Echeverria, The Takings Issue, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE
USE AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 143, 143-48 (John Echeverria &
Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995) ("There can be little doubt that an expanded reading of
the Takings Clause would in fact increase the cost of existing environmental programs
and reduce the level of environmental protection Americans currently enjoy."). But see
Jonathan A. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of
Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 302-05 (2008) (arguing that
economic theory and empirical research demonstrates that failing to compensate private
landowners for the costs of regulation discourages voluntary conservation efforts and
encourages the destruction of environmental resources).
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qualities of land, form a substantial legal impediment to enforcing
regulations that severely restrict land use for the purpose of preserving
environmental quality.
In 2005, the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron reinforced
the economic-based takings problems that are presented in the context of
environmental regulations. 15 Justice O'Connor announced that the main goal
of the Court's takings analysis is to "identify regulatory actions that are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain."' 16 In order
to calculate such equivalence, O'Connor continued, the Court's analysis must
"focus[] directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes
upon private property rights."' 17 Refocusing regulatory takings analysis upon
the severity of the regulatory burden eliminates many of the tangential issues
surrounding land use regulations from the purview of the courts-meaning
that, for example, the legitimacy of a government's environmental concerns
will not affect the courts' analysis. 18 As a result, environmental regulations
will be evaluated primarily upon the degree of economic impact they have
upon a claimant. Proponents of environmental regulations must respond to
the functional equivalence notion of takings by developing arguments that
support the remaining economic value of the land affected by such
regulations.
This Note examines whether conservation easements may serve as a
source of such arguments for proponents of environmental regulations
defending takings claims. Before proceeding with this examination, however,
this Note provides a foundational understanding of the regulatory takings
doctrine, placing particular emphasis on why and how the economic value of
land-or rather, the economic burden of a regulation upon a claimant-plays
such a significant role in the analysis. Part II examines the foundations and
development of regulatory takings analysis as exhibited in a series of
Supreme Court decisions, and Part III discusses the ways in which courts
analyze the economic burdens of government regulation when presented with
a regulatory takings claim. Part IV examines whether the conservation
easements fit within this foundation. This Note finds that the degree to which
conservation easements may affect the regulatory takings analysis will be
determined largely by the amount of funding and policy decisions of the
government entities and conservation land trusts that purchase conservation
easements. Finally, the Note concludes by explaining several benefits that
15 See infra Part H.C.3.
16 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added).
17 Id. (emphasis added).
18 See infra Part II.C.3.
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may arise from the adoption of a public policy that supported this role for
conservation easements in the greater scheme of environmental protection.
II. HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
This Section begins with a review of eminent domain power and the
restraints upon that power that are provided in the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause. The Section then reviews the early interpretation and
implementation of the Takings Clause, leading up to the recognition of the
first regulatory taking in the Supreme Court's decision in Mahon. The final
part of this Section examines the confusion, difficulties and trends that
developed in the Supreme Court's regulatory takings analysis following the
Mahon decision, concluding with an examination of the Court's 2005
decision, Lingle v. Chevron, which refocused the regulatory takings analysis.
A. The Power of Eminent Domain and the Constitutional Restraint
Thereof
Federal, state, and local governments have considerable latitude in
regulating private property. 19 Nearly every sovereign entity commands a
"police power," pursuant to which a legislature may promulgate regulations,
not only to protect public health and safety, but also to promote general
welfare, prosperity, and convenience. 20 The power of eminent domain is just
one aspect of the sovereign police power, and it consists of the authority to
condemn or expropriate private property for public use.21 Generally
speaking, eminent domain represents the pinnacle of a government's
regulatory power over otherwise lawful private property use.
The United States Constitution, however, limits the power of eminent
domain. The Fifth Amendment, in what is variously referred to as the
Eminent Domain Clause, the Just Compensation Clause, as well as the
Takings Clause, states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. '22 The purpose of the Takings Clause is not to
prohibit the government from taking private property,23 but instead to
prevent the government "from forcing some people alone to bear public
19 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987).
20 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
21 Western Union Telegraph Co. of I11. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 110 N.E. 583, 589
(1915); Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 131 P.
43, 57-58 (1913).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
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burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."24  Thus, the Constitution only prohibits the governmental
appropriation of private property when it is for a purpose other than "public
use" 25 and requires that "just compensation" be paid to the owner whenever
private property has lawfully been "taken. '26 This Note does not focus on
questions of what constitutes a "public use" or "just compensation." Instead,
this Note focuses upon whether a "taking" has occurred.
B. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: Recognition of Regulatory
Takings
The Takings Clause was initially understood to have limited legal
implications. 27 For over 130 years, most people thought the Takings Clause
applied only to a "direct appropriation" of private property,28 or the
"functional equivalent of a practical ouster of [the owner's] possession."29
24 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
25 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) ("[I]t has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.").
26 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (citing Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893), and Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304(1923)) ("[Just compensation] means the full and perfect
equivalent in money of the property taken. The owner is to be put in as good position
pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.").
27 In early United States history, the Takings Clause applied only to actions of the
federal government. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243, 250-51 (1833) (rejecting a takings claim leveled against the City of Baltimore
because the Fifth Amendment only applied to the federal government). It was not until
1897 that the Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994) (citing Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)).
28 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (quoting
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1871)).
29 Id. at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879)). It should be noted that scholars
continue to argue over whether the Takings Clause was originally understood to include
regulatory takings. Compare William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 782, 798 (1995) ("The
predecessor clauses to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the original understanding
of the Takings Clause itself, and the weight of early judicial interpretations of the federal
and state Takings Clauses all indicate that compensation was mandated only when the
government physically took property."), and Mathew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings
and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2053,
2008]
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Examples of "direct appropriations" include the Government's physical
occupation of private property or seizure of a business operation. 30 A
"practical ouster" occurs when, for example, a Government action results in
permanent flooding of private property. 3'
Therefore, Government regulations absent such physical appropriations
were not originally considered "takings" that required just compensation,
even when such regulations restricted or eliminated an owner's right to use
private property and thereby caused the owner direct and significant harm.32
The perceived unfairness of this limited application was, understandably, the
source of much controversy. 33 In 1922, the Supreme Court addressed these
concerns and determined that a regulation, despite falling short of physical
appropriation, may nonetheless go so far as to amount to a taking requiring
just compensation. 34
2055 (2004) ("[T]he original understanding of the clause was that compensation for
property affected by government action was due only when the government physically
took the property in question."), with Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original
Intent. The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far," 49 Am. U. L. REv. 181, 182
(1999) ("Contrary to most recent scholarship, the text and historical record of the Takings
Clause arguably support a just compensation requirement for regulatory takings.").
30 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 375-78 (1945) (Government's occupation of a private warehouse effected a taking);
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1951) (Government's seizure
and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking).
31 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13
Wall. 166 (1871)).
32 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 190 (1851) (holding that, despite
the seeming injustice, the Pennsylvania Constitution's just compensation clause only
applied to private property actually taken and not to property that is merely injured or
even destroyed).
33 For example, in 1857 Theodore Sedgwick reviewed a number of state cases that
denied compensation under the Takings Clause in the absence of an actual appropriation
of private property. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519
(1857) ("It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection under this clause,
the property must be actually taken in the physical sense of the word, and that the
proprietor is not entitled to claim remuneration for indirect or consequential damage, no
matter how serious..."). Sedgwick further stated: "I cannot refrain from the expression
of the opinion, that this limitation of the term taking to the actual physical appropriation
of property ... seems to me, far too narrow a construction to answer the purposes of
justice." Id. at 524.
34 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon concerned the economic impact of a
Pennsylvania statute upon a coal company's mining rights.35 Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the Court and found that meaningful enforcement of
the Takings Clause requires protection from extensive land use restrictions. 36
Holmes recognized that regulation under the police power that prohibits the
economic use of property "has very nearly the same practical effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."'37 It follows that, in
order to provide any practical protection of private property, the Takings
Clause must apply to regulations that diminish the value of the affected
property.38 Thus, Holmes famously concluded that, "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking." 39
Unfortunately, Mahon offered little guidance regarding when and under
what circumstances a given regulation goes "too far" for purposes of the
Takings Clause.40 Holmes did say that "[o]ne fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution." 41 But the "extent"
35 Id. at 412. The Coal Company executed a deed that conveyed the surface of a
parcel of land but expressly reserved the right to remove all coal underneath it. Id. Forty
years after the transfer, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute called the Kohler
Act, which prohibited mining of coal in such a way as to cause instability to any human
habitation. Id. at 412-13. Mahon, meanwhile, had obtained the aforementioned surface
rights and built a house upon the land. Id. at 412. Pursuant to the Kohler Act, Mahon
sought an injunction to prevent the Coal Company from mining the coal under the house
he had built. Id. The Coal Company argued that, if not allowed to mine the coal
underneath the house, the Kohler Act was, in effect, a taking by the Pennsylvania
legislature without just compensation. See id
36 Id. at 413-15. Justice Holmes explained that the mining right retained by the Coal
Company in the original deed was, in fact, private property and held considerable value
in terms of the potential profit it afforded. Id.
37 Id. at 414.
38 See id.
39 Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
40 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
41 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. Another factor Holmes considered was the extent of the
public interest being asserted by the statute, which was balanced against the extent of
diminution suffered by the owner of the affected property in what resembled a
substantive due process analysis. See infra Part II.C. 1. Holmes found that the public
interest at issue was limited because the statute was interfering with "ordinary private
affairs," was not remedying a "public nuisance," and was not "justified as a protection of
personal safety." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14. On the other hand, Holmes found that the
Coal Company's mining right was recognized as an estate in land under Pennsylvania
law, and furthermore, was extremely valuable. Id. at 414. Thus, Holmes concluded that
the asserted public interest did not warrant the diminution suffered by the Coal Company.
Id.
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deserving just compensation was defined no further than "a certain
magnitude." 42 Thus, despite endorsing consideration of a regulation's
economic impact, Holmes's opinion contains nothing resembling a concrete
test for the identification of regulatory takings. Instead, Holmes said that "the
question depends upon the particular facts" of the case. 43 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly echoed this sentiment, admitting failure to develop any "set
formula" for determining how far is too far, and preferring instead to engage
in what are "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."44
C. Moving Towards a Cohesive Regulatory Takings Analytical
Framework
This Section traces the history of the Supreme Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence following Mahon. This Section focuses upon the inherent
problem with regulatory takings analysis-the difficulty of determining
when a regulation has gone "too far" for purposes of the Takings Clause.
While this Section examines the differing approaches the Supreme Court has
taken when answering this question, it concludes that the Court's Lingle
decision has significantly refocused the analysis and eliminated much of the
confusion in this area of the law. Specifically, this Section will show why
Lingle will have the effect of refocusing the regulatory takings analysis on
the economic impact of governmental action upon the affected parcel. This is
an important development for environmental protection because most
environmental regulations impose development restrictions and therefore
frustrate the economic value of affected parcels, which is why this Note
examines a potential argument supporting the economic value of conserved
land.
1. Confusion: The Legacy of Mahon
As explained in the preceding section, Mahon left the Supreme Court
with a very difficult question-when does a regulation go "too far" for
purposes of the Takings Clause-and very little analytical guidance to
develop an answer. For over fifty years following Mahon, the regulatory
42 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
43 Id.
44 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
124).
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takings issue was not addressed in a meaningful manner by the Court.45 But,
beginning in the 1970s, and in the thirty years since, the Court has regularly
taken the opportunity to establish or identify an analytical framework for
determining when a regulation has gone "too far" 46-though to varying
degrees of success.47 In order to understand the direction in which the
Court's takings analysis is moving, and why it has moved in that direction, it
is helpful to understand the challenges the Court has faced in the years
following Mahon.
Problems with the doctrine are traced back to when the Supreme Court
first applied the Takings Clause to the states in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co.48 The Court applied the Takings Clause to a state action
because it held that just compensation was a due process right under the
Fourteenth Amendment.49 The resulting rationale amounted to a confusing
merger of "a due process inquiry into the underlying validity of a state action
with a takings inquiry that, in its plain meaning, places a condition on an
otherwise valid state action due to its impact on private property interests." 50
This merger of the Takings and Due Process doctrines influenced Mahon,
which was decided under the Due Process Clause as much or more so than it
was decided under the Takings Clause.51
45 Daniel A. Jacobs, Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451,
463 (2006).
46 Lewis S. Wiener, Has the High Court Taken Away Private Property Rights?, 20
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 39, Aug. 12, 2005, at 2, available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/081205LBWiener.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (citing to
the Supreme Court's thirty-three takings decisions between 1979 and 2005).
47 For example, by the early 1980s, the Court was applying at least two different
formulations for deciding regulatory takings cases. See John A. Humbach, The Takings
Clause and the Separation of Powers: An Essay, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 3, 20 (2003)
(explaining the difference between the "three-part" test developed in Penn Central and
the "two-part" test developed in Agins).
48 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 458.
49 Id. at 458-59.
50 Id. at 458 (emphasis in original). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Court, in the years leading
up to and including Mahon, "fused the two express constitutional restrictions on any state
interference with private property-that property shall not be taken without due process
nor for a public purpose without just compensation-into a single standard").
51 Humbach, supra note 47, at 18 ("Pennsylvania Coal was not actually decided
under the takings clause but under the due process clause."); Jacobs, supra note 45, at
460 (noting that the remedy provided in Mahon-striking down the law rather than
awarding just compensation-is evidence of the Court's intermingling of the Due Process
and Takings Clauses).
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Further complicating the matter was the fact that Mahon was decided at
the height of Lochner-era economic due process, whereby the Supreme Court
reviewed economic regulations, such as land use laws, under its perceived
role as a kind of "super-legislature. '52 The Court's decision in Mahon was
essentially an economic due process case in which the Kohler Act was
determined to have failed all three elements of the Lawton v. Steele test.53
The Court abandoned the economic due process doctrine in 1938 when it
announced the "rational basis" test, under which far more deference was
given to an elected legislature's economic decisions.54 Perhaps because the
"regulatory taking" issue was born during the Lochner era, and was not
addressed in the post-New Deal era during which other Lochner-era rationale
was dismissed, it is not surprising that economic due process somewhat
confused the Court's regulatory takings analysis following the issue's revival
in the 1970-80s. 55
2. Resurrecting and Rectifying the Regulatory Takings Analysis
The Burger Court's opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City marked the first meaningful assessment of the regulatory takings
doctrine since it was established by Mahon in 1922.56 In Penn Central, the
Court was asked whether the application of New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law to the parcel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal
52 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 459, 461. The basic ideology of economic due process
was that the constitutional structure of government provided for judicial supervision of
economic legislation. See also Humbach, supra note 47, at 23 (explaining that the
economic due process doctrine gave the courts the "power to second-guess elected
legislatures on the 'wisdom' of economic legislation").
53 Humbach, supra note 47, at 18. Under the Lawton v. Steele economic substantive
due process test, a court would invalidate economic legislation if it failed to meet the
following factors: (1) the interests of the public generally must require the commercial
interference; (2) the means must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the public
purpose; and (3) the means must be not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). Humbach argues that the rationale in the Mahon
opinion mirrors the factors set out in Lawton v. Steele. Humbach, supra note 47, at 18.
Especially significant is the fact that the opinion concludes: "[W]e should think it clear
that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a
destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414
(emphasis added).
54 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). See also
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner
... that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded.").
55 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 461-62; Humbach, supra note 47, at 22-23.
56 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 463.
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was a taking without just compensation for purposes of the Takings Clause. 57
The law, as applied, prevented plaintiff, Penn Central, from constructing a
55-story office tower on top of the terminal and thus, it was argued,
significantly undermined the economic value of that parcel of land.58
Generally speaking, the Court rejected Penn Central's challenge by
applying a three-factor test that was derived from an assortment of previous
decisions. 59 The Court considered: (1) the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental
action.60 With regard to the third and final factor, the Court declared that a
"'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government ... than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good. '61 This three-factor
test has since become the dominant method of regulatory takings analysis. 62
But in the same opinion, Justice Brennan in dicta heralded the
development of a wholly separate analysis for regulatory takings that became
known as the "substantially advance" test.63 The Court formalized the
"substantially advance" test in Agins v. City of Tiburon, in which it held that
the application of a local land use law to a particular parcel of property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not "substantially advance legitimate
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land," and
furthermore, that the question "necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests." 64 Thus, Agins added a second, non-economic prong to the
takings analysis-a prong which very much resembled the economic
substantive due process analysis of the Lochner-era Court.65 In the years
57 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107.
58 Id. at 116-17.
59 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 463.
60 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
61 Id
62 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 463.
63 Id. Specifically, Justice Brennan noted "that a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose." Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127. Justice Brennan cited a Lochner-era economic
substantive due process case in support of this proposition. Id. (citing Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)); see also Jacobs, supra note 45, at 460-61. The
Nectow opinion is also cited in Agins. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
64 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
65 See Jacobs, supra note 45, at 463.
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following Agins, the Court repeatedly conflated the Penn Central economic
impact analysis with the Agins "substantially advance" test.66
In 2005, however, the Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron repudiated
the Agins "substantially advance" test and in so doing, made great strides in
establishing a cohesive regulatory takings analytical framework. Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court and denounced the "substantially
advance" test because it would allow the "courts to substitute their predictive
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies." 67 In other
words, the Court expressly set out to divorce the due process analysis from
the takings analysis. 68
3. Going Forward: "Functionally Equivalent" Analysis
The "substantially advance" test was, in general, a "little-used and poorly
understood theory," which may lead one to assume that Lingle was in fact a
narrow decision of little consequence. 69 But upon closer examination, it
becomes clear that the Court expressed a greater understanding of the
regulatory takings analysis in Lingle than it had exhibited in any previous
decision.70 Justice O'Connor announced that the main goal of the Court's
takings analysis is to "identify regulatory actions that are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain." 71 In order to calculate
such equivalence, O'Connor continued, the Court's analysis must "focus[]
directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon
private property rights."'72
Proponents of environmental regulations must respond to the functional
equivalence notion of takings by developing arguments that support the
remaining economic value of the land affected by such regulations. Justice
O'Connor's attempt to directly focus the regulatory takings inquiry upon the
severity of the regulatory burden echoes Justice Holmes's original edict: "if
6 6 Id. at 465.
67 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (2005).
68 See id. at 542-44.
69 Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from
Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 371, 371-72 (2006).
70 Id. at 398, 401.
71 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added).
72 Id. (emphasis added). The "substantially advance" test has no place under this
understanding of the takings analysis because, as Justice O'Connor pointed out, it
"reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation
imposes upon private property rights," nor about "how any regulatory burden is
distributed among property owners." Id. at 542 (emphasis in original).
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regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. '73 Refocusing
regulatory takings analysis upon the severity of the regulatory burden
eliminates from the purview of the courts many of the tangential issues
surrounding land use regulations. As a result, environmental regulations will
be evaluated primarily upon the degree of economic impact they have upon a
claimant.
Some commentators have speculated upon whether the functional
equivalence notion has altered the takings standard so as to require a greater
economic burden. Robert Dreher, Professor of Natural Resources Law at
George Washington University Law School, argues that Lingle has set the
takings standard higher-requiring a burden that would approach if not equal
the total loss that physical expropriation would inflict.74 The higher standard,
he argues, will not only reduce the number of takings claims, but embolden
government regulation by limiting the risk of financial exposure to takings
liability. 75 While it remains to be seen whether Lingle will move the standard
in one direction or the other, scholars are likely to find out because, contrary
to Professor Dreher's assumptions, an emboldened government will likely
increase the number of takings claims going forward.7 6
Increasing environmental concern amongst the American public
combined with a Democrat resurgence in state and federal government likely
means reinvigorated environmental regulation and, subsequently, diminution
of property value to a greater extent and to a greater amount of land. The
increasing public concern for environmental issues, however, is unlikely to
offset the litigious response that most citizens have when environmental
regulations reduce the economic value of their property.77 So while Lingle is
certainly a "win" for the government,78 One should not assume that private
73 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added).
74 Dreher, supra note 69, at 402. See also Andrew W. Schwartz, How the
Government Can Avoid Property Rights Litigation, SM040 ALI-ABA 497, 504-06
(2007) (noting that "[in Lingle] the Court returned to the original, limited formulation of
regulatory takings, limiting compensable regulation to those that are the functional
equivalent of eminent domain"); Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications
for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 573, 582 (2007) (speculating that the
courts might "ratchet[] up the 'economic impact' prong of Penn Central" in response to
Lingle).
75 Dreher, supra note 69, at 402-03.
76 See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 65.
77See, e.g., Charles R. Wise, Property Rights and Regulatory Takings, in
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED 289-91 (Robert F. Durant, Daniel J.
Fiorino & Rosemary O'Leary eds., 2004) (describing the "visible, conflictual, and
litigious" response to environmental regulations over the past quarter century).
78 Dreher, supra note 69, at 401 ("[T]here is no doubt who won and who lost in
Lingle.").
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property owners will suddenly throw down the proverbial sword and accept
economic losses in the name of environmental stewardship. Built upon this
conviction, this Note examines the ways in which the courts determine
whether the severity of a regulatory burden amounts to the functional
equivalent of a direct appropriation,79 and then examines whether
conservation easements may have an impact on the analysis.
80
III. EXAMINING How COURTS ANALYZE THE ECONOMIC BURDENS OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
As explained above, Lingle v. Chevron represents an important change in
the Court's approach to the regulatory takings issue. 81 First, the Court
eliminated one of the two formulations that it had been using in regulatory
takings cases. 82 Second, and more importantly, the Court sought to establish
a cohesive approach to all regulatory takings by characterizing the goal of
courts hearing such claims as an effort "to identify regulatory actions that are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain."83 In order
to determine whether a regulatory action is functionally equivalent to a direct
appropriation, the courts must examine the "severity of the burden that [the]
government imposes upon private property rights." 84 The way in which the
courts have and will analyze the severity of the regulatory burden is the
subject of this Section.
Environmental regulations affecting private land use will generally be
analyzed under two standards. 85 The first, which this Note will refer to as the
79 See infra Part III.
80 See infra Part IV.
81 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 473-75.
82 Jacobs, supra note 45, at 451-52 ("The Court, in Lingle, took the well-accepted
precedent that a law violates regulatory takings doctrine if it fails to 'substantially
advance' the government's asserted interest in passing the law [per the Agins two-part
test], and decided it was inimical to a modem understanding of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause.").
83 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. at 539 (2005) (emphasis added).
84 Id.
85 The Supreme Court has actually developed no less than four modes of analyzing
regulatory takings claims-only two of which are discussed in this Note. See John C.
Keene, When Does a Regulation "Go Too Far? "-The Supreme Court's Analytical
Framework for Drawing the Line Between an Exercise of the Police Power and an
Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 397, 419-21
(2006). One that this Note will not discuss applies when a regulation forces an owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion of his property. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing
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Lucas test,86 is a categorical rule, whereby a regulation that completely
deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial us[e] of her property" is
deemed a per se taking. 87 If, on the other hand, it is determined that some
economically beneficial use remains, then the court will analyze the severity
of the burden under the standards set forth in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).88 The Penn Central test, as this
Note will refer to it, balances three factors: (1) the "economic impact" of the
government action; (2) the extent to which the action "interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations"; and (3) the "character" of the action.89 The
goal of this Section is to establish a framework with which to analyze-in
Part IV-the potential impact of conservation easements upon the
determination of regulatory burdens.
A. Lucas Test: Deprivation ofAll Economically Beneficial Use
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court
established a categorical rule by which any regulation that deprives an owner
of all economically beneficial use of his or her property is a per se taking.90
Above all, it is important to understand that Lucas established a very narrow
rule.91 Justice Scalia, who authored the Lucas opinion, said himself that the
rule would only apply in "relatively rare situations. '92 And in Lingle, Justice
O'Connor reiterated that sentiment by explaining that the Lucas test applied
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419-20 (1982)). The
presence of a permanent physical invasion amounts to a categorical, or per se, regulatory
taking. Id. The second mode of analysis this Note will not discuss applies when the
government imposes an exaction-in the form of an interest in real property, money or
services-as a condition for the grant of a development permit. Lauren Reznick, The
Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in
the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 727 (2007). Lingle cast a shadow of
uncertainty over this area of the law. See id. at 727-29 (discussing whether Lingle will
force the Court to reconsider the standard that applies to development exactions).
86 This categorical rule was formally established by the Supreme Court in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
87 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
88 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
89 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
90 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
91 John D. Echeverria, The Death of Regulatory Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291, 293
(2007) ("[A]fter Tahoe-Sierra the Lucas rule might not even properly apply to the Lucas
case itself and is, regardless, virtually meaninglessness in practice."); Robert Meltz,
Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 353 (2007)
(discussing "the exceedingly narrow scope of Lucas's total taking rule").
92 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
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to a "relatively narrow" set of claims that involve "the complete elimination
of a property's value."'93 That being said, environmental regulations often
place absolute restrictions on the developmental use of an owner's entire
parcel of property and in these situations plaintiffs can argue that such
restrictions cause a Lucas taking.94
The Court has repeatedly said that "the issue [of] whether a landowner
has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a
predominantly factual question." 95 Generally, the predominant fact to be
considered is value-and specifically whether the land has been deprived of
all its value. 96 But two issues central to a determination of value are (1) does
value mean economically beneficial use or merely land value, and (2) how
much value must remain to avoid deprivation of all value? 97 These issues are
examined in turn below.
1. Economic Use or Land Value?
In Lucas, Justice Scalia used the terms "use" and "value"
interchangeably, 98 suggesting ambiguity as to whether a total loss of both
economic use and land value must be shown in order to trigger the
categorical rule.99 A possible explanation for this ambiguity is that the Court
was bound by the trial court's finding that the regulation deprived the
plaintiff of any reasonable economic use of his property and, as a direct
result thereof, destroyed all value in that property. 100 Thus, the Lucas Court
93 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
94 Meltz, supra note 91, at 331. Meltz also explains that the existence of claims
made under the Lucas argument is a result of the fact that a plaintiff is more likely to win
if the court analyzes under the Lucas test than if the court analyzes the plaintiffs claim
under the more deferential Penn Central balancing test. Id. at 330-31.
95 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720
(1999).
96 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
97 Meltz, supra note 91, 331-32.
98 Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007 ("This case requires us to decide whether the
Act's dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas's lots accomplished a taking of
private property.. ."), with Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("The second situation in which we
have found categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land.").
99 See Meltz, supra note 91, at 331.
100 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009 ("[T]his prohibition deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable
economic use of the lots.... eliminated the unrestricted right of use, and render[ed] them
valueless.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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itself did not endeavor upon an economic analysis of the regulatory impact
upon Lucas's land.' 0 '
As a result, plaintiffs have argued that development restrictions effect a
Lucas taking even when significant land value remained. 10 2 Most courts
analyze takings claims under the Lucas test in terms of the "economic,"
"beneficial," or "productive" use remaining-and not in terms of the
remaining land value.' 0 3 This is in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court
has emphasized in recent years the importance of determining whether a total
loss of value has occurred when applying the Lucas test. 104 Perhaps the
confusion over this issue is best exemplified by a Federal Circuit decision,
which held that the owner of land subject to current development restrictions
may nonetheless enjoy economic use of that land by selling it to speculators
willing to gamble that the restrictions will be lifted someday. 10 5 Thus, that
court found, on the one hand, that land is valueless without developmental or
economic land use rights, but on the other hand, the possibility of future
developmental use will always generate current or immediate economic use
due to the uncertain nature of land use legislation.10 6
In regards to the examination of environmental regulations, a court will
be less likely to find a taking if land value is the focus of the analysis. 10 7 A
parcel of property will almost always retain some value, even if that value is
speculative in nature. Economic, beneficial and productive ideas of use, on
the other hand, are closely tied with development and profit-both of which
are inimical to most environmental regulations. Since most courts examine
101 Id. at 1020 n.9 (noting that the trial court's finding that Lucas's land was
rendered valueless was not challenged and therefore not considered by the Court in
rendering its opinion).
102 Meltz, supra note 91, at 331.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) ("[T]he categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in
value were 95% instead of 100%... [a]nything less than a complete elimination of value,
or a total loss ... would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central.") (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("In the Lucas
context, of course, the complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative
factor.").
105 Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902-03 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("We do not perceive any legal reason why a well-informed 'willing buyer' might
not bet that the prohibition of rock mining, to protect the overlying wetlands, would some
day be lifted.").
106 See id.
107 See, e.g., supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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Lucas claims in terms of the regulatory impact upon economic use, 10 8
defenders of environmental regulations must be prepared to argue that
economic use can be made of undeveloped land. Because Lucas is such a
narrow rule, most claims made under it will fail. However, analysis of
economic impact is also a central element of the Penn Central test, which is
why this Note examines potential arguments for the economic use of
undeveloped land in Part IV.
2. How much value is "no value"?
The Supreme Court has said that Lucas is a narrow rule, applying only to
situations in which a parcel of land is left with no value. 109 But because one
could argue that a parcel of land will always retain some value subsequent to
regulation,1 0 the question remains as to how much the land's value must be
diminished in order to amount to a Lucas taking."I' The Supreme Court, in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, said that a "[s]tate may not evade the duty to
compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token
interest." 112 But the Court found that the $200,000 remaining from the
$3,150,000 pre-regulation value of the property was more than a "token
interest" despite being a ninety-four percent diminution in value. 113 Thus,
Palazzolo proved that Justice Scalia's suggestion in Lucas that a ninety-five
percent diminution in value would not fall under the categorical rule was not
made arguendo.114
In addition to its "token interest" language, the Court has also examined
whether a regulation has left the property "economically idle."' 1 5 For
example, the plaintiff in Palazzolo purchased his property with the
expectation of developing a 74-lot residential subdivision." 6 Despite the fact
that the plaintiffs expectations were completely quashed with respect to his
development plans, the Court nonetheless determined that the regulation did
not leave the property "economically idle" because it permitted the plaintiff
108 Meltz, supra note 91, at 331.
109 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.
110 See, e.g., supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
111 Meltz, supra note 91, 331-32.
112 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
113 Id. at 606, 631.
114 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. Furthermore, Justice Scalia described the total
taking situation as "extraordinary" and "relatively rare." Id at 1017-18.
115 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
116 Id. at 606.
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to build a single residence. 117 The Palazollo decision not only suggests that
the Lucas test requires total elimination of the use or value of a claimant's
entire parcel, it also suggests that "use" may not be so closely associated with
"profit" within the meaning of the test.
These factors play a crucial role in the analysis in Part IV-whereas the
proof of any income that can be derived from owning totally undeveloped
land may prevent a claimant from finding success under the Lucas test. In
fact, because the standard is so high, fee owners of land rarely succeed in
bringing claims under Lucas--even when development rights are totally
restricted. 118 As a result, most takings claims are examined under the Penn
Central test.
B. Penn Central Balancing Test for Partial Regulatory Takings
Academics have criticized the Court's "vague ad hocery" in approaching
the "famously muddy language of the Penn Central decision."'' 19 The
Supreme Court itself has admitted to the troubles associated with an analysis
under the Penn Central guidelines. 120 Nonetheless, the test remains the
117 Id. at 631.
118 Meltz, supra note 91, at 332. Meltz notes that "[e]ven a parcel on which one
cannot build at all likely retains value as private open space for a neighbor, or for
speculation that the restriction someday will be lifted," and concludes that Lucas would
be more applicable to less-than-fee interests in land because the value of such interests is
more likely to be totally eliminated. Id.
119 Michael M. Berger, Tahoe-Sierra: Much Ado About-What?, 25 U. HAW. L. REV.
295, 311-12 (2003); John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra
Regulatory Takings Decision, 32 ENvTL. L. REP. 11,235, at 11,235 (2002), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/currentresearch/documents/RTPubsLawELR
TahoeSierra.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008); Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and
Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 679, 679-80 (2005); Gideon Kanner,
Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark. Has the US. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its
Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 309 (1998).
Perhaps the biggest problem with the Penn Central analysis is that the economic
assessment it promotes conflicts with the legal principles it applies. See William W.
Wade, Penn Central's Economic Failings Confounded Takings Jurisprudence, 31 URB.
LAW. 277, 278-79 (1999). For example, the "whole parcel rule" starkly contradicts
incremental economic theory. Id. at 278. (explaining that incremental economic theory
provides "that economic activity is best analyzed in terms of incremental units, elements,
and decisions").
120 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 n. 17 ("When... the owner contends a taking has
occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are
tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-
evident, and the analysis is more complex."); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("The Penn Central
factors-though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-have served as the
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primary mode of regulatory takings analysis. 121 The Penn Central "test" is
actually just an analytical framework whereby a court examines a takings
claim along three guidelines: (1) the "economic impact" of the government
action; (2) the extent to which the action "interfere[s] with distinct
investment-backed expectations"; and (3) the "character" of the action.1 22
Amidst the "considerable uncertainty" endemic to regulatory takings law
since its genesis in Mahon,123 courts cling to this framework when answering
the fundamental question: When has a regulation gone "too far" for purposes
of the Takings Clause?
Lingle focused the regulatory takings analysis directly upon the
economic prongs of the Penn Central test. Justice O'Connor declared that the
Penn Central test "turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the
magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests. ' 124 But, as Professor Dale
Whitman points out, "if Lingle is taken seriously, it appears to destroy the
'character of the governmental action' prong of the Penn Central takings
test." 125 If Whitman is correct and Lingle is taken seriously, 126 the result will
be a greater focus upon the economic prongs of the Penn Central test, which
principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the
physical takings or Lucas rules.").
121 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
122 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
123 John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 171, 174-75 (2005) ("To date, the ad hoc Penn Central analysis has appeared to
mask, if not intellectual bankruptcy ... at least considerable uncertainty about the
fundamental parameters of takings law."). See also infra Part II.B (explaining the
uncertainty associated with the analysis in Mahon).
124 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
125 Whitman, supra note 74, at 574. Whitman's conclusions are based upon the fact
that none of today's legitimate interpretations of the "character" prong "focus on the
regulation's impact on the owner, which is precisely the only focus that a proper takings
analysis can have, according to Lingle." Id. at 581.
126 There are some indications that the lower courts will interpret Lingle as
destroying the "character" prong of the Penn Central test. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms,
Inc. v. United States, 2007 WL 5177409 at *8 (noting that the Federal Circuit's analysis
under the "character" prong seems to have been voided by Lingle). But see
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1312-16 (N.D. Okla. 2007)
(extensively analyzing the regulation at issue under the "character" prong of the Penn
Central test and concluding it weighed strongly in favor of the claimants). However,
despite "significant concerns about the character of the governmental intrusion," the
Henry court determined that, in light of Lingle, "economic loss seems to be a requirement
of a Penn Central taking rather than merely one factor in the analysis" and therefore
concluded that "the 'character of the governmental intrusion' prong can [not] overcome
the absence of economic harm." Id. at 1316-17.
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further emphasizes why it is important for defenders of environmental
regulations to develop arguments in support of the economic value of
undeveloped land.
This Note presents a simplified analysis of the ways in which the courts
determine the economic burden imposed by a regulation upon a takings
claimant. Analyzing the regulatory burden of land use regulations is difficult
and this section is not intended to be an exhaustive explanation of that
process. 127 Instead, this section is designed to provide a framework for
analyzing the potential impact of conservation easements on the regulatory
burden of land use regulations.' 28 To that end, this section will address just
three issues: (1) whether the regulatory burden is to be measured in terms of
remaining economic use or remaining market value; (2) the methods of
calculating value loss; and (3) the degree of loss required to effect a taking.
For the sake of brevity, the discussion of these issues combines elements of
both the "economic impact" and "investment-backed expectations" prongs of
the Penn Central test, and thus does not analyze them separately. 129
127 Echeverria, supra note 123, at 179 n.34 (.'[l]and-use regulations are ubiquitous
and most of them impact property values in some tangential way-often in completely
unanticipated ways."' (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324)). For example, Echeverria
cites the difficulty in determining whether a government action imposes losses upon
individual owners or, instead, benefits each as a result of the same restrictions being
imposed upon all the property in a certain area. Id at 179.
128 See infra Part IV.
129 While courts do employ the "expectations" prong as a separate analysis, it is best
understood to function in conjunction with-or as a subsidiary or precondition of-the
"economic impact" inquiry. Generally, the "expectations" inquiry cuts against regulatory
takings claims. For example, courts are reluctant to accept a takings claim when the
property owner had notice of a pre-existing restriction. Echeverria, supra note 123, at
183-84. This is the case despite the fact that the Supreme Court, in Palazzolo, 535 U.S.
606 (2001), rejected a rule whereby notice absolutely barred a subsequent takings claim.
Echeverria, supra note 123, at 183 (noting that "Palazzolo has had remarkably little
impact" because "[t]akings claims brought by purchasers with notice continue to be
rejected on a fairly routine basis"). See also Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d
1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that notice may not serve as an absolute bar, but
still plays a large role in assessing takings claims). Other courts discount takings claims if
the regulatory burden was reasonably foreseeable. For example, courts ask: "(1) whether
the plaintiff operated in a 'highly regulated industry;"' (2) whether the plaintiff, when
purchasing the property, was aware of the problem that gave rise to the regulation; "and
(3) whether the plaintiff could have 'reasonably anticipated' the possibility of such
regulation in light of the 'regulatory environment' at the time of purchase." Appolo
Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). If
the answer to these questions is "yes," then the "expectations" inquiry may have the
effect of undermining regulatory takings claim that might otherwise allege sufficient
value loss to warrant just compensation. See id. In the sections below, this Note will
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1. Economic Use or Market Value: The Standard of Measurement
Because the Penn Central opinion did not declare whether economic
impact was intended to be measured in terms of remaining economic use or
remaining market value, courts have applied both standards of measurement
when analyzing regulatory takings claims. Many state courts focus on
economic use130 while the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
tend to focus upon market value.' 3 ' The next Section (III.B.2.) examines the
methods of calculating remaining market value. This Section addresses the
meaning of "economic use," which is important because most courts find that
development restrictions totally frustrate economic use 132 and most
environmental regulations place restrictions on development. In other words,
strictly conserved land is generally thought to have no economic use. If
conservation easements are to have a meaningful impact upon the regulatory
takings analysis, they must be able to fit within the courts' understanding of
economic use.
The meaning of an economically viable "economic use" is not restricted
to uses that return a profit, such as logging or condominium development. 33
Land use is "economically viable" when "a sufficient number of people
would be willing to buy the property for that use, whatever it might be, to
make the property 'commercially marketable. '"l34 Proving the viability of
the remaining economic use is a separate hurdle for the government-in
order to allege that remaining uses offset the losses imposed by the land use
restrictions, the government must first prove that the alleged remaining uses
are viable. 135 One standard that courts apply when determining whether an
economic use remains viable consists of two requirements: the government
must show a "reasonable probability that the land is both [1] physically
analyze the ways in which the "expectations" inquiry affects the "economic impact"
inquiry more directly.
130 Meltz, supra note 91, at 334 (citing Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State, 117
P.3d 990 (Or. 2005)).
131 Id. (citing Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
132 See, e.g., Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State, 117 P.3d 990 (Or. 2005) (decision
based upon the assumption that a logging restriction frustrated the economic use of that
portion of plaintiff's property to which it applied).
133 See Meltz, supra note 91, at 336.
134 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1243 (D. Nev. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 216 F.3d 764
(9th Cir. 2000), affd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
135 See, e.g., id
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adaptable for such use and [2] that there is a demand for such use in the
reasonably near future. '136
In proving that the land is physically adaptable for the remaining use, the
courts are not to consider the relative economic value of the use. 137 But
"physical adaptability" means something more than mere "physical
possibility."'1 38 Rather, there must be a "reasonable possibility" that the
landowner could put his tract of land to the alleged remaining use. 139 As a
result, "physical adaptability" may not be found if there are unreasonable or
unattainable prerequisites for using the land in the alleged manner.140
The second requirement is an extension of the first. Just as mere physical
possibility cannot establish physical adaptability, physical adaptability
cannot establish economic viability unless there is a reasonable probability
that there is a need or demand for the alleged remaining use.141 An alleged
remaining use that amounts to mere speculation or conjecture will not be
considered a viable economic use.142 The government must provide evidence
showing that the alleged remaining use is feasible and that there would be a
demand for that use in the reasonably near future. 143 Often times, tangential
factors will inform a court's determination of whether an economic use
136 Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 262 (2001) (quoting Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158 (1990)), affd, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
137 See id. (stating that plaintiff's concerns over the diminished profitability of the
remaining use "go not to the viability of the project, but to the value thereof').
138 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) ("The use of shorelands for
reservoir purposes ... shows merely the physical possibility of so controlling the level of
the lake. But physical adaptability alone cannot be deemed to affect market value.").
139 Id. at 256-257.
140 See, e.g., id. (finding that there was no reasonable possibility for owner to use his
property as a reservoir because building it would have required the purchase of several
flowage easements that "were not currently bought or sold to such an extent as to
establish prevailing prices, at or as of the time of the expropriation").
141 United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 633 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1980)
("Thus, Olson teaches that a proposed 'use' requires a showing of reasonable probability
that the land is both physically adaptable for such use and that there is a need or demand
for such use in the reasonably near future."). 341.45 Acres applied this rule to a
landowner that alleged certain uses in order to increase the amount of just compensation
due as a result of a regulation that frustrated the alleged uses. Id. But Walcek v. United
States extended the rule to situations in which the government offers proof of the value in
the remaining use of regulated property so as to avoid a successful takings claim. Walcek,
49 Fed. Cl. at 262.
142 341.45 Acres, 633 F.2d at 110.
143 Id. at 111. Such a showing may be made by calling witnesses to testify as to
feasibility and demand. Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 262.
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remains for the property at issue, such as factors increasing a property's
speculative value. 144
The most common way of determining whether a demand exists for the
alleged remaining use is to examine whether a competitive market exists for
purchasing the property despite the restrictions imposed by the regulation at
issue. 145 Under this mode of analysis, if "a significant number of people
would be willing to buy the property" in spite of the land use restrictions,
then that property would be "commercially marketable" and thus have an
economic use. 146 This approach may be subsumed under the analysis
described in the next section, and thus many courts often skip this inquiry
altogether and go straight to determining the loss in market value as a result
of the regulation. But when the alleged remaining use is valued in an
emerging market this issue is of special importance, because many
claimants-and courts-may not even be aware that such markets exist.
Thus, before the government can even allege the remaining value in regards
to conservation easements, that entity must first prove that deriving value
from those sources would be feasible for the claimant.
2. Methods of Calculating Value Loss: Determining the Regulatory
Burden
There are generally three methods of determining the economic impact
of government regulation on a parcel of property. 14 7 The first method, which
this Note refers to as the "comparable sales approach," relies upon a
comparison in the fair market value of the property with and without the
regulation in order to determine the diminution in value. 148 The second
method is similar but compares the regulated market value of the property
with the owner's original cost basis instead of the non-regulated value of the
144 See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(in the typically rabid real estate market in South Florida, the ability to sell development-
prohibited wetland to speculators willing to gamble that restrictions might someday be
lifted was a viable economic use).
145 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1243 (D. Nev. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 216
F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
146 Meltz, supra note 91, at 336.
147 See, e.g., Cane Tennessee v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 432, 440 (2005)
(describing appraisal of claimant's property "using three different methods of valuation:
(1) the comparable sales approach; (2) the cost approach; and (3) the income
capitalization approach").
148 See Echeverria, supra note 123, at 180.
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property.' 49 The third method, which this Note refers to as the "income
capitalization approach," analyzes the effect that a regulation has upon the
realization of a reasonable return and/or profit on a particular investment.1 50
In general, courts may use any method of valuation--or even combine
methods-in order to tailor their analyses to the particular circumstances of
the alleged taking. 151 This section will only discuss two of these methods: the
comparable sales approach and the investment capitalization approach.152
a. Comparable Sales Approach
The most common approach to determining the economic impact of a
governmental regulation on a property is to compare the fair market value of
the property before the land use restrictions were imposed with the fair
market value afterward. 153 The general understanding of market value is that
it represents "[t]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future."'1 54
149 Id. at 181.
150 Id. at 182.
151 See Meltz, supra note 91, at 336-37 (citing Cane Tennessee, 71 Fed. CI. at 439).
This is especially true in the Federal Circuit:
The Federal Circuit ... has made clear that it is unwilling to restrict the trial courts
to any single basis for determining fair market value, preferring instead to afford
trial courts considerable discretion to select the method of valuation that is most
appropriate in the light of the facts of the particular case. The selected method of
valuation may be a single method or some combination of different methods.
Cane Tennessee, 71 Fed. Cl. at 439 (quoting Barrett Refining Corp. v. United States, 242
F.3d 1055, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and Seravalli v. United States, 845 F.2d 1571, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 The recoupment of cost basis approach is somewhat of a hybrid of the two other
approaches in the sense that it comprises both a comparison of market values and analysis
of the return on an investment (non-negative, zero percent return). However, the courts
generally apply the cost basis approach only as a matter of convenience to bolster their
"preexisting disposition to find no taking based on comparison of before-value and after-
value." Meltz, supra note 91, at 338.
153 Meltz, supra note 91, at 336. Echeverria actually describes the test in somewhat
different terms: "the difference, as of the date of the alleged taking, between the 'fair
market value' of the property (1) subject to the regulatory constraint being challenged,
and (2) assuming the regulation being challenged did not apply." See Echeverria, supra
note 123, at 180. But his different construction, which highlights the issue of reciprocal
values created by certain regulations, is not significant in light of the scope of this Note.
154 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). See also United States v.
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1949); Meltz, supra note
91, at 336.
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But determining the "highest and most profitable use" of a parcel of property
can be a difficult, imperfect, and contentious process. 155 As a result, the
courts adopted the idea of "fair market value. ' 156 Fair market value has been
defined as "the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."' 15 7
It follows that the most popular method of determining market value
with and without a regulatory burden is the comparable sales approach,
whereby the value of the property is determined by comparing sales of
certain parcels of land that are similarly situated to the land the claimant
alleged to have been taken. 158 The comparable sales approach generally
consists of a review of a variety of property sales in the area, from which
only some are chosen for comparison. 159 As a result, to use the comparable
sales approach, there must be a market for the type of property at issue.160
Where there are not enough sales of similarly situated property to make
accurate price comparisons, then there is "no market" for that property, and
other means of determining market value may be relevant to what a
prospective purchaser would have paid, such as evidence of scattered or
sparse sales. 161 However, scattered or sparse sales are given less weight in
establishing the value of the property allegedly taken.162
This issue is particularly significant in the context of emerging markets.
The revenue potential of conservation easements is unlikely to be considered
in a common appraisal. Therefore, the impact that conservation easements
will have upon the regulatory takings analysis is harnessed to the
155 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (cautioning that the
"assessment of market value involves the use of assumptions, which make it unlikely that
the appraisal will reflect true value with nicety").
156 See, e.g., Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625
(2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 734 (1999) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157 United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (quoting 26 C.F.R.
§ 20.2031-1(b)).
158 Meltz, supra note 91, at 336.
159 Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 432, 446 (2005). When
comparing the properties, adjustments are made for factors such as property location,
size, and terrain. Id. Professional appraisers, as expert witnesses, generally do most of the
leg work in establishing the evidence necessary to analyze a taking under the comparable
sales approach. See, e.g., id.
16 0 See infra Part IV.C.





development of these markets. That being said, the impact of these emerging
markets stands to be considerably greater if a court employs the comparable
sales analysis than if a court employs the investment capitalization approach
discussed in the next Section.
b. Investment Capitalization Approach
Under this approach, which is informed by both the "economic impact"
and "expectations" prongs of the Penn Central test, courts focus on the
degree to which a regulation affects a particular investment. This approach
may have its origins in the text of the Penn Central opinion, which states in
support of denying the taking claim: "[O]n this record, we must regard the
New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the
Terminal but also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment."1 63
However, the approach itself is problematic. 164 Profitability has not
traditionally been recognized as a protected property interest under the
Takings Clause. 165 Furthermore, Penn Central did not declare that an
individual is entitled to profits or a reasonable return on an investment-
rather, the Court merely cited evidence of a reasonable return as support that
a taking had not occurred. 166
Despite its problems, the investment capitalization approach is still being
applied. It is most often applied when a claimant alleges that a regulation
restricts an already existing property use, such as a going business
concern. 167 For example, in Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 168 the
163 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
164 See Echeverria, supra note 123, at 182.
165 See id. See also, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("[L]oss of future
profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender reed
upon which to rest a taking claim."). In the context of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has found that while a business's assets are property
subject to deprivation, neither the activity of doing business nor of making a profit is
property subject to deprivation. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
166 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 149. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that
individuals are entitled to a reasonable return on their investment. Id. at 149 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("The Court has frequently held that, even where a destruction of property
rights would not otherwise constitute a taking, the inability of the owner to make a
reasonable return on his property requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment.")
(citing United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903)) (emphasis omitted). See also,
e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (2005).
167 Meltz, supra note 91, at 337. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States,
373 F.3d 1177, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (remanding for determination of whether regulatory
burden upon a chicken farming business is best measured by a decline in market value or
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined the economic
impact of health regulations on a chicken farming business through a
comparison of the plaintiffs actual earning with the projected earnings if the
restrictions were not in place. 169 If a court were to take this approach when
determining the economic impact of a highly restrictive environmental
regulation, the government would likely lose. 170 However, because the
market for conservation easements is geared more towards undeveloped land,
and a going business concern is more likely to exist on developed land, this
test is less of a concern for the purposes of this Note. 171
3. Degree of Loss Required. When Regulation Has Gone "Too Far"
In the absence of a bright line dividing compensable from
noncompensable regulatory actions, the courts, as discussed in the preceding
section, turn to an examination of empirical evidence to determine the
severity of the economic impact upon the affected property. 172 And while
there is no percentage of value loss that, once reached, results in a per se
taking-other than a total economic wipeout' 73-it is generally understood
that only severe economic impacts can establish regulatory takings. 174 The
Lingle decision, emphasizing the severity necessary to establish a taking,
stated that the goal of regulatory takings analysis is to identify regulatory
business profitability), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1104 (2005). On remand, the trial court
found that the investment capitalization approach was more appropriate for measuring the
economic impact on a "going business concern." Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States,
No. 92-710C, 2007 WL 5177409, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Jul. 11, 2007) (quoting Rose Acre
Farms, 373 F.3d at 1188-89). See also, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d
1319, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that a 96% loss in the rate of return on an
investment was a sufficient economic impact to warrant just compensation).
168 373 F.3d 1177, 1184-90 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
169 Rose Acre Farms, 2007 WL 5177409 at *6-8.
170 See, e.g., id.
171 There are, however, some industries that operate on the type of land that
purchasers of conservation easements heavily desire. Some examples include the logging
industry, the mining industry, and several sectors of the energy industry. See U.S. SMALL
BusiNEss ADMINISTRATION, LENDER AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LOAN PROGRAMS
app. at 329 (2008), available at http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/
sbahomepage/serv sops_50105.pdf.
172 See Wade, supra note 11, at 349.
173 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
174 See Echeverria, supra note 123, at 178; Meltz, supra note 91, at 334 ("The Court
has said several things ... indicating that the economic impact generally must be very




actions that are so burdensome that they are "functionally equivalent to the
classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or
ousts the owner from his domain."' 175 This strong language both reflects the
high degree of economic impact that most courts require to find a taking 176
and, perhaps, suggests that the standard may move even higher. 177 Because
two different methods -of calculating value loss were discussed in the
preceding section, this section will examine two different standards of loss
required to establish a taking-one under the comparable sales approach and
one under the investment capitalization approach.
a. Degree of Loss Required Under the Comparable Sales Approach
Applying the comparable sales approach to loss valuations, the Supreme
Court has indicated that reductions in value of over seventy, eighty, and even
ninety percent are not necessarily so severe as to constitute a taking. 178 The
Colorado Supreme Court has summarized U.S. Supreme Court precedent as
"provid[ing] an avenue of redress [only] for a landowner whose property
retains value that is slightly greater than de minimis," a test that is reserved
for the "truly unusual case." 179 And the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which
handles most takings claims against the federal government and routinely
applies the comparable -sales approach, generally requires a diminution in
value "well in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking."'180
Emphasizing the high degree of loss required, Lingle declared that
regulatory takings occur only when the economic impact is so severe as to be
"functionally equivalent" to a direct appropriation.181 While the opinion as a
175 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
176 See Echeverria, supra note 123, at 178; Meltz, supra note 91, at 334.
177 See supra note 74 and accompanying text; Echeverria, supra note 123, at 178;
Meltz, supra note 91, at 334.
178 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926)
(finding no taking despite 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 405 (1915) (finding no taking despite 92.5% diminution in value).
179 Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of
La Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 65-66 (Colo. 2001). See also K & K Const., Inc. v. Dep't. of Envtl.
Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 377-78 (Mich. App. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1928
(2007), reh 'g denied, 127 S. Ct. 2906 (2007) (finding no taking despite 67% diminution
in value); Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000) (holding parking,
picnics, barbecues, and other recreational uses were sufficiently valuable to avoid a
"taking" despite a strict non-development regulation).
180 Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271 (2001).
181 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). Elsewhere, the Court has said that
land use regulations amount to takings in "extreme circumstances." See, e.g., United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
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whole will likely have the effect of focusing the regulatory takings analysis
more directly upon the severity of economic loss resulting from a given
regulation, 182 this language, in particular, strongly suggests that the Court
will continue to find takings only in extraordinary circumstances where the
diminution in value is extreme. As Robert Meltz has succinctly pointed out,
"[i]t is difficult to argue that small to moderate economic impacts are the
functional equivalents of appropriations or ousters." 183 As a result, it will be
interesting to see if, going forward, Lingle results in the application of a
higher threshold for successful takings in the courts. 184 For now, however, it
is safe to assume that courts applying the comparable sales approach will
find takings only in the extraordinary circumstance that a regulation results in
at least a seventy-five percent diminution in the value of the claimant's
property-and some courts may require more diminution.
b. Degree of Loss Required Under the Investment Capitalization
Approach
When a taking is found despite a less-than-seventy-five percent
diminution in the property's market value, it is generally because the court
takes the investment capitalization approach. The investment capitalization
approach is most significant in two situations: (1) when the claimant recently
purchased the property 185 with the intent to profitably use or develop the land
but has yet to realize a reasonable return on the original investment; 186 and
(2) when the regulation has restricted the claimant's already profitable use of
the land. 187 Under the investment capitalization approach, the court does not
focus upon the diminution in the market value of the affected property, but
rather upon the diminution in the profitability of the property.
182 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
183 Meltz, supra note 91, at 334.
184 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
185 If the claimant has held the property at issue for a long time, and that property is
undeveloped, then the courts may apply the cost basis approach, in which case the
government is likely to win due to appreciation and the speculative value that exists for
practically all land today regardless of the regulatory encumbrances. See Meltz, supra
note 91, at 337-38.
186 See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 38, 43 (1999)
(concluding that a 73.1% diminution in value was indicative of a Penn Central taking
because the owner could only recoup half of its original investment in the property).
187 See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 527, 534, 536




The "reasonable investment-backed expectations" prong of the Penn
Central test has a significant influence on the courts' analysis under the
investment capitalization approach.' 88 If it is determined that the claimant
could not have reasonably expected to receive a return on the investment--or
realize a profit from the endeavor-then the court is unlikely to find a taking
under the investment capitalization approach. 189 If the claimant was
reasonable in expecting a return on the investment, then the court must
determine what return would be reasonable, which is generally calculated
using expert testimony and provided as a percentage of the investment.1 90
The difference, then, between the actual return and the reasonable return
represents the diminution in value of the claimant's property. 191 As with the
comparable sales approach, the line at which a diminution in return becomes
a taking seems to be around seventy-five percent. 192 However, some
commentators have suggested that an economic impact is severe enough to
require compensation whenever a government action prohibits an owner from
realizing a reasonable return on the investment in the affected parcel. 193
Regardless of the exact application, the investment capitalization approach
has generally meant success for the claimant.
IV. EXAMINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN
THE REGULATORY TAKINGS FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this Note is to examine the potential impact that
conservation easements may have upon a regulatory takings analysis.
Specifically, this Note asks whether conservation easements represent a
potential economic use for regulated land that lessens the economic impact of
environmental regulations. A preliminary search revealed no case law in
which a government entity has argued that conservation easements provide a
source of value to the encumbered property owner. Furthermore, it is not my
188 See Echeverria, supra note 127, at 184.
18 9 Id.
190 See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, 75 Fed. Cl. at 534. For a more detailed analysis of
this process, see Wade, supra note 11. Dr. Wade is a resource economist who has served
as an expert witness for plaintiffs counsel in several takings cases. Id. at 337 n.*. Dr.
Wade's article examines the perceived advances in economic analysis that have been
made over the course of the past few decades in the Federal Claims and Circuit Courts.
Id. at 337.
191 See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, 75 Fed. Cl. at 534.
192 See generally Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (noting that a less than 75% diminution is not an automatic barrier to
compensation, but recognizing that the figure can serve as a guidepost).
193 See Wade, supra note 11, at 347.
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intention to merely make predictions as to how a court would receive such an
argument. Instead, the purpose of this examination is to highlight the issues
that would arise in the context of such an argument. It is important to
examine the possible economic values of conserved land because, due to the
Supreme Court's decision in Lingle, the regulatory takings analysis is likely
to be almost entirely focused upon the economic impact of regulatory
restrictions. Thus, this section begins with a general review of conservation
easements. Using that review as a foundation, this section turns to an
examination of whether conservation easements represent an economic use
for regulated land and, if so, whether that use is valuable in such a way as to
affect a takings review under either the Lucas test or the Penn Central test.
A. Conservation Easements: An Introduction
A conservation easement is a legal contract that entails the transfer of
certain "sticks" in the "bundle of rights" associated with the ownership of
private property and is therefore a "partial interest" in land. 194 The property
owner, or grantor of the easement, retains the possessory interest in the land
while transferring to the grantee the right to prevent the grantor or anyone
else from engaging in certain activities that would be detrimental to the
grantee's conservation goals.195 The activities prohibited by the conservation
easement vary according to the contract-some easements may prohibit all
ground-disturbing activities while others may allow for farming or
sustainable logging. 196 Some easements may also provide affirmative rights
to the grantee, for example, the right to study, preserve, or restore the
conservation value of the encumbered property.197
Perhaps the most unique characteristic of modem conservation
easements is the fact that most are drafted to protect the land they encumber
in perpetuity, thereby providing the grantee with more permanent and less
costly land protection than term contracts. 198 Though conservation easements
194 Federico Cheever, Property Rights and the Maintenance of Wildlife Habitat: The
Case for Conservation Land Transactions, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 431, 440 (2002).
195 Id.; see also James Boyd, Kathryn Caballero & R. David Simpson, The Law and
Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions,
19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 215 (2000).
196 Cheever, supra note 194, at 440.
197 Id. at 442. Often times, contracting for these rights can be difficult. See Boyd,
Cabellero & Simpson, supra note 195, at 215. Perhaps even more problematic is the fact
that these terms are often difficult to both monitor and enforce. Id.
198 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 675 (2007). McLaughlin notes that perpetuity is also desirable from
the perspective of the grantor. Id. Grantors are only eligible for the federal tax benefits
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have been used in the United States since the late nineteenth century, today's
perpetual easements may not be valid under most states' common law
systems, many of which reflect the long-standing policy against undue, or
"dead-hand," restraints on landowners' ability to transfer real property. 199
Perpetual conservation easements, therefore, exist mostly as a result of the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act of 1981 (UCEA) and the subsequent
state statutes modeled after it, which were generally designed to supersede
the common law restrictions on perpetual easements.200
The UCEA establishes two requirements that are unique to conservation
easements. First, all conservation easements must identify a conservation
purpose, for example, protecting natural resources, enhancing air and water
quality, or assuring the property's availability for agricultural, forest,
recreational, or open-space use.20 1 Second, conservation easements may only
be granted to qualified holders. 20 2 A qualified holder is either a governmental
body or a charitable organization with a conservation purpose. 20 3 Thus, under
the UCEA, private individuals cannot hold conservation easements. 204 Most
qualified holders of conservation easements are land trusts-private non-
profit organizations formed at the local, state, and national levels and created
for the purpose of conserving a certain type or tract of land that is important
to the community it serves. 20 5
There are many reasons why conservation easements are a popular
method of conserving land: (1) they are less costly than purchasing fee
interests outright; (2) they do not require additional administrative resources;
associated with conservation easements if the easements are expressly perpetual. Id.
Furthermore, she cites studies indicating that permanent protection of cherished land is
one of the primary factors motivating grantors of conservation easements. Id. at 676.
199 Jane Prohaska, Conservation Easements: An Overview, SM041 ALI-ABA 5,
* 12-13 (2006); Anna Vinson, Re-Allocating the Conservation Landscape: Conservation
Easements and Regulation Working in Concert, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 276
(2007).
200 Vinson, supra note 199, at 276. Twenty-four jurisdictions have adopted the
UCEA while many other states have adopted versions of it. Prohaska, supra note 199, at
*12. The requirements of some state laws vary from the provisions of the UCEA; for
example, the Massachusetts law requires government approval of privately held
easements. Id. at * 13.
201 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT OF 1981 § 1.1, § I cmt., 12 U.L.A. 171
(1996).
202 Id. § 1 cmt.
203 Id. § 1.2.
204 Prohaska, supra note 199, at *14.
205 LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT 3 (2005),
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf [hereinafter
2005 LAND TRUST CENSUS].
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(3) based primarily on contract law, they require limited statutory attention;
and (4) because they are voluntarily undertaken, they do not represent a
government intrusion upon property rights.206 There are also, however, many
challenging and problematic aspects to the use of conservation easements.
First, the contracting costs associated with the division of ownership rights
are high because, due to the long-term effectiveness of the easement, the
contract must account and provide remedies for future conflicts between the
landowners and the conservators. 20 7 Second, because they are based upon
voluntary actions, conservation easements cannot be used to address one of
the primary challenges facing conservators: dealing with the "hold out"-the
individual or firm that prefers not to join the community efforts to protect the
environment. 208 Along the same lines, the individuals who are most likely to
voluntarily surrender development rights are those who think they will be
burdened the least by the restrictions. 209 The burden, here, represents
primarily the degree to which the individuals would have to change their land
use plans under the terms of the conservation easement.2 10 It follows that
conservation easements, used alone, are unlikely to achieve drastic changes
in land use.211 Therefore, conservation easements are most effective in
protecting undeveloped land that is owned by an individual or firm that does
not plan on developing their land.
206 See Boyd, Cabellero & Simpson, supra note 195, at 219. See also Vinson, supra
note 199, at 286-301.
207 Some estimates have shown that contracting costs can amount to 4% of the
easement's overall value. See Boyd, Cabellero & Simpson, supra note 195, at 219
(quoting Lancaster County Agric. Pres. Bd., 200 Farms and over 17,000 Acres Now
Preserved, AGRICULTURAL PRESERvE BOARD NEWS, Summer 1994, at 1).
208 John Echeverria, Skeptic's Perspective on Voluntary Conservation Easements,




2 10 See id.
211 See id. It must be noted that the skepticism of conservation easements that
Echeverria expresses in this article arises in large part because he is analyzing their utility
in the context of large scale environmental problems. See id. Large scale environmental
problems are caused by damaging land uses. See id. As a result, he finds that, because
"those most likely to change land uses in the near future will be least likely to volunteer,"
the conservation easement movement is devoting conservation resources to the wrong
individuals and would be better directing their efforts towards those individuals more
likely to take up damaging land uses. See id. This is a valid point, but in the regulatory
takings context, the individual's desire to change his land use has been frustrated and as a
result, the voluntariness problem is somewhat diminished. Thus, this Note envisions a
cooperative relationship between the land trusts and the legislatures to achieve better
overall protection of the environment.
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Despite its problems, the use of easements as a land conservation method
is increasing at an incredible rate.212 Federal and state tax credits for the
donation of conservation easements are the driving force behind this
increasingly popular conservation method. 213 The donation of a conservation
easement may constitute a charitable gift that is deductible for federal and
state income tax purposes so long as the property and easement meet certain
criteria.214 While most conservation easements today are donated, many land
trusts and governmental entities are also in the business of purchasing
them.215 Most conservation easements are donated rather than sold because
government entities and land trusts generally have limited funds to put
towards the outright purchase of conservation easements. Furthermore, these
organizations must account for the stewardship costs associated with
supervised land, which is a substantial concern.216 Certainly, for conservation
212 Vinson, supra note 199, at 275. In 1950, there were only 53 land trusts in
existence. 2005 LAND TRUST CENSUS, supra note 205, at 12. By 2000, that number
exceeded 1200, and in the five years between 2000 and 2005, another 400 land trusts
were established, bringing the total to 1,667. Id. at 4. In 2000, there were 2,514,545 acres
under easement by local and state land trusts. Id. at 8. By 2005, that number increased by
148% to 6,245,969 acres. Id.
213 See 2005 LAND TRUST CENSUS, supra note 205, at 8. The Land Trust Alliance
has put forth a substantial effort towards expanding the tax benefits of donating
conservation easements and was awarded in 2006 with a congressional bill that provided
expanded relief. See also LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006),
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/who-we-are/2006-annual-report/at-download/
file (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). Many states have incorporated deductions into the law as
well, which also serve as considerable motivation for the donation of conservation
easements. See, e.g., Illana Poley, Conservation Easements Protect Colorado Open Space
at Year-End, CHERRY CREEK NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.thecherrycreeknews.com/content/view/134/52/ (describing the "flurry of
year-end activity to finalize conservation easements" in Colorado that resulted from a
change in the law, going into effect Jan. 1, 2008, that would raise the tax standards).
214 See Stephen J. Small, Proper-and Improper-Deductions for Conservation
Donations, Including Developer Donations, TAX NOTES, at 221 (Oct. 11, 2004),
available at http://www.stevesmall.com/uploads/22.pdf. The value of the gift, as
determined by a qualified appraisal, is equal to the difference between the fair market
value of the property before and after the easement is donated. Id.
215 See Cheever, supra note 194, at 432. See also, e.g., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY,
ALL ABOUT CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/
conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/about/allabout.html (last
visited on Nov. 17, 2008). See also LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, CONSERVATION OPTIONS FOR
LANDOWNERS, http://www.lta.org/conserve/options.htm#easement (last visited Oct. 12,
2007). When land trusts do purchase interests in land, it is generally in the form of a
"bargain" purchase of land, whereby the land trust purchases a fee simple interest in
property at a price lower than its fair market value. Id.
216 See Echeverria, supra note 208.
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easements to play a very significant role in takings analysis, the funding of
conservation land trusts and/or governmental purchasing programs must be
increased. However, this Note does not investigate ways in which that can be
accomplished. Instead, this Note examines the problems and/or issues that
arise as a result of that lack of funding.
B. Tax Benefits: No Place in the Regulatory Takings Framework
Conservation easements do not represent a "free market solution" to
environmental problems. 217 Most conservation easements are voluntarily
donated because of the tax benefits that such donations provide for the donor,
and as a result, "[t]he lion's share of the funding for'easements... comes out
of the pocket of the taxpayer." 218 Because development rights are often very
valuable assets, the amount of these charitable donations, and the resulting
tax benefits they provide, can be quite large. 219
However, these tax benefits would not be realized by an individual
whose land has been strictly regulated. The income tax benefits would not
apply because if the donor could not, for example, build on the encumbered
property in the first place, there would be no appreciable dollar value given
up in the transaction, which is the basis of the income tax deduction.220
Because a takings claimant would not be able to realize these tax benefits,
the source of a conservation easement's economic value in the takings
analysis must reside in the ability to sell it.221
C. Is There a Market for Conservation Easements-Could There Be a
Market?
Because tax benefits are not available to a takings claimant, the crucial
question becomes whether a "market" for selling conservation easements
truly exists. If the owner of a regulated parcel cannot sell the development
rights to his property, then the courts are unlikely to find that conservation
217 Echeverria, supra note 208.
218 Id
219 The deduction a landowner can take for donating a conservation easement is
30% of his or her adjusted gross income. Upper Valley Land Trust, http://www.uvlt.org/
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008). See also 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2003).
220 See Small, supra note 214, at 221.
221 See, e.g., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, ALL ABOUT CONSERVATION EASEMENTS,
supra note 215. See also, Margaret Jackson, Ranchers Rush to Secure Conservation
Easements, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 4, 2007 at 1C (reporting the rush to secure




easements provide any economic use. The idea of "economic use" plays an
important role in the regulatory takings analysis under both the Lucas222 and
Penn Central223 test. If a regulation leaves a landowner with any
"economically viable use" of his land, then a taking cannot be found under
Lucas.224 And under the "economic impact" prong of Penn Central, the
remaining "economic uses" of a regulated parcel are factored in any
calculation of the diminution in market value.225 Thus, if conservation
easements represent a remaining economic use, then they may support the
defeat of a takings claim.
In order for the sale of conservation easements to represent an economic
use, the government must show that the regulated parcel is both (1)
"physically adaptable for such use" and (2) that there is a "demand for such
use in the reasonably near future." 226 Because an easement transaction is
selling a property interest, the "physically adaptable" aspect of this test is not
particularly important, unless, for example, the development rights on the
affected parcel have already been sold to another purchaser, in which case it
would be "physically" impossible to sell them again.227
The second aspect of the test, however, is extremely significant in the
context of conservation easements because the demand for such easements is
particularized and tenuous. The most common way of determining whether
demand exists for a particular use is to examine whether a significant number
of individuals would be willing to purchase the property in spite of the land
use restrictions. 228 Because conservation easements serve a particular
purpose, and the potential buyers have limited purchasing power, the
development rights on only certain parcels of land are likely to be purchased.
Therefore, it must first be determined whether the regulated property is
"conservation-worthy"--that is-does the property have ecological qualities
deserving conservation? For semi-pristine, undeveloped land, this question
would pose little problem. But where the regulated parcel has been
developed, polluted, or otherwise harmed---or where a significant investment
would be required to rehabilitate the ecological integrity of the parcel-then
222 See supra Part III.A.
223 See supra Part II.B.1.
224 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
225 Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 262 (2001).
226 Id (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158
(1990)).
227 "Physical adaptability" may not be found if there are unreasonable or
unattainable prerequisites for using the land in the alleged manner. Id.
228 See Meltz, supra note 91, at 336. See also, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1243 (D. Nev. 1999), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), afid, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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the development rights on that parcel of land are unlikely to elicit any
demand on the conservation easement "market."
The more crucial inquiry, however, is whether there is a reasonable
probability that potential buyers will have sufficient funds to purchase the
development rights of the regulated parcel in the near future. If it is
determined that the "market" for conservation easements amounts to mere
speculation or conjecture, then the sale of an easement will not be considered
a viable economic use and a taking will be found under the Lucas test.229
Likewise, under the "economic impact" prong of the Penn Central test,
courts generally use the comparable sales approach, which requires the
existence of a market for the type of property at issue. If there are no
comparable sales of conservation easements in the area of the allegedly taken
land, then the courts will not consider such a sale in the value of the
claimant's post-regulation property.
No one can argue that conservation easements are currently bought and
sold on a competitive market.230 As discussed in the preceding section, most
conservation easements today are donated to land trusts for tax purposes.
More often than not, the purchaser of conservation easements is a local land
trust that operates as the lone purchaser of conservation easements in the
community 231-hence, no competition. And, perhaps most importantly, there
is the question of whether a land trust, when faced with the decision to
expend some of its limited funds to secure an easement, would choose to
spend those funds on a regulated parcel or on a non-regulated parcel. Most
likely, the choice would be the latter. The goal of most land trusts is
conservation-as much conservation as possible. 232 Therefore, many land
trust organizations may treat the passing of a restrictive environmental
regulation as a victory, and as a result, place no further efforts towards
securing the ecological qualities of the properties affected by the regulation.
This is especially true with land trusts that operate on a national scale since
229 United States v. 341.45 Acres, 633 F.2d 108, 108 (8th Cir. 1980).
230 See Cheever, supra note 194, at 432. Cheever, reflecting upon the "market" for
conservation easements, states:
I am not asserting that land trusts and government entities do not pay money for
conservation servitudes. .. . [Moreover] I am sufficiently steeped in the economic
tradition to expect that the purchasers of conservation easements-private land trusts
and local government-would compete with each other by offering the owners of
particularly spectacular parcels of land "better deals" to encumber their land. Yet, in
my experience, I have encountered no evidence of this kind of competition.
Id. See also Echeverria, supra note 208.
231 See Vinson, supra note 199, at 275.
232 See, e.g., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, WHERE WE WORK,
http://www.nature.org/wherewework/?src--t3 (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
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they tend to focus on conservation of particular types-rather than particular
parcels-of property.233 As a result, there is a significant possibility that
whatever "market" which may exist for conservation easements on non-
regulated parcels of land may disappear once development on that property is
restricted by governmental regulation.
There are, however, several reasons why an individual purchaser may be
available for the takings claimant. First, the land trust might, though
doubtfully, decide to purchase the conservation easement regardless of the
regulation. There are several reasons which might support such a decision:
conservation easements are held in perpetuity, while regulatory policies can
change with each passing election; enforcement of land use restrictions can
be spotty, for example, variances can be given; conservation easements may
allow access and stewardship where land use restrictions may not; and
finally, easements purchased from an individual whose land has allegedly
been taken are likely to be cheaper than when purchased from an
unencumbered landowner. 234 Furthermore, as urban areas continue to expand
outward, two things happen to undeveloped, open space that increases the
value of conservation easements: (1) with less undeveloped land to protect,
land trusts will be able to focus their efforts upon a smaller portion of land,
and (2) as the amount of undeveloped land declines, the appreciation of open
space will grow, and so too will the desire to preserve it.235 Thus, as the
supply of conservation-worthy land declines, the demand will increase and
come closer to meeting the actual fair market value of the development
rights.236
Second, some states and municipalities have programs whereby
developers must mitigate the environmental damage caused by any approved
development. 237 Sometimes, this mitigation may be met by purchasing
conservation easements on land elsewhere in the jurisdiction.238 If states and
233 See, e.g. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, FINAL REPORT: CONSERVATION
EASEMENT WORKING GROUP, 6-9 (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.nature.org/aboutus/
howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/files/easements-r
eport.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
234 A conservation easement on unencumbered property typically costs half as much
as an outright purchase, whereas to avoid a taking, land trusts would need to offer only
15-25% of an outright purchase on encumbered property. See Daphne Sashin, Ag Chief
Let's Pay Farmers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR
4116341.
235 Boyd, Cabellero & Simpson, supra note 195, at 210.
236 Vinson, supra note 199, at 276-77.
237 See, e.g., Frank Dobrovnik, Super-Duper Wal-Mart to Cast Its Shadow on Tiny
Sault, Mich., THE SAULT STAR, Mar. 7, 2008, at A3.
2 3 8 Id.
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municipalities lifted restrictions on those purchases, that would go a long
way towards building a more fluent market for conservation easements. This
could foster a relationship between local control of development (causing
demand for conservation easements) and federal management of the
environment (causing supply for conservation easements).
D. If There Were a Market, What Are the Implications?
Assuming that there is a market, the most common approach to
determining the economic impact of a governmental regulation on a property
is to compare the fair market value of the property before the land-use
restrictions were imposed with the fair market value afterward. 239 Fair
market value has been defined as "the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts."240 Courts applying the comparable sales
approach will find takings only in the extraordinary circumstance where a
regulation results in at least a seventy-five percent diminution in the value of
the claimant's property-and some courts may require more diminution.
This is the most interesting aspect of the analysis. Because the courts
generally will not find a taking unless at least seventy-five percent of the
value in the claimant's property has been diminished, a market for
conservation easements that could account for the twenty-five percent that it
takes to frustrate takings claims would practically nullify all takings claims
filed in response to environmental regulations. While twenty-five percent is
still a considerable amount of money, it is much, much less than the amount
of "just compensation" money that it would take the government to exercise
its eminent domain power and condemn the same property.
There are more than just monetary advantages to this approach. Because
the land trusts are generally community-oriented, and would obtain the
stewardship responsibilities for the regulated tracts of land, the conservation
of that land will likely be undertaken with greater care than when a distant
state or federal governmental entity assumes stewardship responsibility.
239 Meltz, supra note 91, at 336. Echeverria actually describes the test in somewhat
different terms: "[Tlhe difference, as of the date of the alleged taking, between the 'fair
market value' of the property (1) subject to the regulatory constraint being challenged,
and (2) assuming the regulation being challenged did not apply." John D. Echeverria,
Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171, 180 (2005). But his
different construction, which highlights the issue of reciprocal values created by certain
regulations, is not significant in light of the scope of this Note.




Individuals tend to take more pride in something when they feel they have a
working connection to it.241
Furthermore, this setup would cut down on the regulating entities'
transaction costs. These entities could pass, for example, somewhat general
development restrictions, which would allow the community-based land
trusts to establish the particular extent of the regulation via the conservation
easement negotiation. Most environmental regulations generally take local
input into consideration when establishing rules. It may be more efficient to
separate the process. For example, the larger-scale regulating entities would
establish the scientific-based parameters within which use may occur without
endangering the ecological qualities sought to be protected. 242 Then, the local
conservation land trust, a community-based group, would use the contractual
process to establish more specifically the restrictions upon each of the
individuals with affected property.243 This process may have the added
benefit of calming the anger that generally arises when an individual's land
use is restricted by the government. 244
V. CONCLUSION
Whether or not conservation easements will have an impact on the
regulatory takings analysis depends in large part upon whether a court will
find that a "market" for them exists. The two most important issues with
241 ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: EcOSYsTEMs, DEMOCRACY,
& AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 244-48 (2003) (discussing the advantages of collaborative
processes that involve both federal land management agencies and local communities,
including examples of programs that have successfully implemented a more collaborative
approach to environmental conservation).
242 While Keiter strongly supports local community-based conservation efforts, he
also recognizes that such initiatives must include the participation of both local and
federal authorities because, inter alia, some environmental and land management
problems are national in scope and therefore necessitate national intervention, for
example, in the form of national standard-setting. See id. at 303-06. See also Annecoos
Wiersema, .4 Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENvTL. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2008)
(discussing why "nested scales" of ecosystem management are more appropriate for
dealing with the ever more complex "nested systems of nature" that humans uncover and
attempt to manage) (on file with author).
243 See KEITER, supra note 241, at 246 (explaining the benefits of involving local
communities in ecosystem management, including the ability to uncover and consider
information beyond the scope of a federal agency and provide "a forum where new
resource management policies and proposals can be tested and shaped to fit local
circumstances").
244 Id. (arguing that collaborative land management between local communities and
federal agencies can "strengthen community relationships [and] help reduce acrimony").
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regard to whether there is a "market" for conservation easements are: (1)
whether the potential purchasers of conservation easements-government
entities and conservation land trusts-have sufficient funding to, in fact,
purchase easements on the allegedly taken land; and (2) whether, assuming
such funding did in fact exist, these purchasers would decide to purchase
easements on encumbered property, or rather, would direct that funding to
unencumbered property. If these questions are addressed, and a market in
conservation easements were to be more fully developed, the degree to which
land use may be restricted without requiring just compensation would
increase.
Moreover, adopting a policy whereby a market in conservation
easements is developed for the purpose of defeating takings claims would
provide several advantages. First, purchasing conservation easements on
regulated property is likely to be far cheaper than condemning land and
paying just compensation payments. Second, allowing land trusts to handle
the negotiation of conservation easements on individual parcels of land
would cut down on the administrative costs of regulating the land from the
top down. Regulatory agencies would not need to involve stakeholders as
much, focusing instead upon the science-based parameters for protecting the
ecological qualities in a particular region. Finally, because land trusts are
generally local community groups, the stewardship they would provide on
the protected lands would be done with more care than if that stewardship
would be done solely by the regulatory agencies. For all these reasons, public
support for a market in conservation easements is an intriguing prospect.
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